

[Version 5/08/2025, approx. 09:12 A.M. Caution, this version has several phrasing corrections that provide substantial difference with earlier versions.]

A Petition for Amending the U.N. Charter

Herewith now I vote for only one amendment proposal, of any of the following three proposals 1 and 2 for U.N. Charter Chapter IV Article 10, and 1 for U.N. Charter Chapter IV Article 18-4, to be ratified into the U.N. Charter:

[Amendment Proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Functions And Powers Article 10:](#)

“Article 10 - 1. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 10 – 2. The General Assembly must at all times, per the General Assembly's affirmative vote that equals at least greater than one-half of the General Assembly's total membership vote, specify for and provide a UN General Assembly International Security Quorum, that for all of the UN, provides an identification and description of any nation's current international security status. If upon receiving from the (UN General Assembly) International Security Quorum, the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the General Assembly finds to an extent of 44% or greater affirmatively, in the General Assembly's finding decision vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that respectively currently the nation of the quorum's security description, is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of

aggression, the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until respectively the General Assembly finds affirmatively, per greater than 56% of the General Assembly's subsequent vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that the nation isn't a party so.”, or

Amendment Proposal 2 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . .

Functions And Powers Article 10:

“Article 10 - 1. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 10 – 2. The General Assembly must at all times -- per the General Assembly's affirmative vote that equals at least greater than one-half of the General Assembly's total membership vote, -- specify for and provide a UN General Assembly International Security Quorum, that for all of the UN, provides an identification and description of any nation's current international security status. If upon receiving from the (UN General Assembly) International Security Quorum, the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the General Assembly finds to an affirmative extent of 44% or greater, in the General Assembly's finding decision vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that respectively currently the nation of the quorum's security description is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of aggression, the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until respectively the General Assembly finds affirmatively, per greater than 56% of the General Assembly's subsequent vote under this

Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that the nation isn't a party so.”, or

[Amendment Proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Voting](#)

[Article 18](#): “Article 18 - 4. Per this exception to subArticle 18 – 2, if upon receiving from a UN General Assembly International Security quorum, -- that at all times, is of at least greater than one-half of the UN General Assembly's membership, ratified completely as being currently specifically valid to recognize for all of the UN, any nation's international security status,-- the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the UN General Assembly votes 44% or greater affirmatively, in the General Assembly's vote decision under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that currently respectively the nation of the quorum's security description is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of aggression; the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until respectively the General Assembly finds affirmatively, per greater than 56% of the General Assembly's subsequent vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that the nation isn't a party so.”

Herewith now I vote for only one amendment proposal, of any of the following four amendment proposals 1, 1-1, and 2 for U.N. Charter Chapter V Article 27, and 1 for U.N. Charter Chapter VII Article 51, to be ratified into the U.N.

Charter:

[Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(a) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Security Council, provided that each

United Nations (U.N.) Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision specifically pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision specifically pertains to, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for both each voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation so, and each voting-abstention-required Security Council decision so, a U.N. member nation that then

(1) is not a Security Council member, and affirmatively per greater than at least 56% of the General Assembly's then expedited complete vote, or per the General Assembly's then expedited designation, of a majority of the (Article 10-2) International Security Quorum, is certified as not being

(a) a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(b) a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the voting-abstention-required decision, in place of and for only one of however many voting-abstention-required Security Council member nations then are required to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N.

General Assembly per a random selection process that at least greater than one-half of the U.N. General Assembly's membership constituency has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation's full optional and voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the Security Council member nation's optional and voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(b) If due to the paragraph (3)(a) Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security

Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.

(4) Every U.N. Security Council member optionally and voluntarily-exercised vote abstention in a decision, must be counted as both one-half vote for and one-half vote against passage of the decision.”, or

[Amendment Proposal 1-1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(a) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including all – if any -- concurring votes that in the decision are cast of the permanent members that do not abstain from then voting; provided that each U.N. Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision specifically pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision specifically pertains to, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then

(1) is not a Security Council member, and affirmatively per greater than at least 56% of the General Assembly's then expedited complete vote, or per the

General Assembly's then expedited designation, of a majority of the (Article 10-2) International Security Quorum, is certified as not being

(a) a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(b) a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the (abstention-required) decision in place of and for only one of however many Security Council member nations then are required (of this Article) to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that at least greater than 50% of the U.N. General Assembly's membership constituency has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's full optional and voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's optional and voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(b) If due to the Article 27(3)(a) Security Council member substitution requirement, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected

for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members – including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.

(4) Every U.N. Security Council member optionally and voluntarily-exercised vote abstention in a decision, must be counted as both one-half vote for and one-half vote against passage of the decision.”, or

[Amendment Proposal 2 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(4) Every U.N. Security Council member mandatorily-exercised or optionally and voluntarily-exercised vote abstention in a decision, must be counted as both one-half vote for and one-half vote against passage of the decision.”, or

Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression Article 51:

“(1) Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(2) When any member of the Chapter V Article 23 United Nations Security Council members, is – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, each U.N. Security Council member that is a party so, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that specifically pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and each so abstention-required decision, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and affirmatively per greater than at least 56% of the General Assembly's then expedited complete vote, or per the General Assembly's then expedited designation, of a majority of the (Article 10-2) International Security Quorum, is certified as not being

(1) a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(2) a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to temporarily substitute serve in the abstention-required decision in place of and for only the Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority – i.e., any majority that is greater than 50% -- has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full optional and voluntary Security Council voting right -- including the member's optional and voluntary voting abstention right – only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

Every U.N. Security Council member optionally and voluntarily-exercised vote abstention in a decision, must be counted as both one-half vote for and one-half vote against passage of the decision.

(3) If due to the Article (51)(2) Security Council member substitution requirement, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members – including all

Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of the remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”

Herewith now I provide – though I don't vote for – the following acceptable alternative Amendment Proposal 2:

[Alternative Amendment Proposal 2 for U.N. Chapter VII, Article 51:](#)

“(2) Each member of the Chapter V Article 23 United Nations Security Council members, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public

security force, -- is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that specifically pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council voting-abstention decision so required, and each Security Council member nation that in the decision is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then is not a Security Council member, and that

(a) affirmatively per greater than at least 56% of the General Assembly's then expedited complete vote, or per the General Assembly's then expedited designation, of a majority of the (Article 10-2) International Security Quorum, is certified as not being

(1) a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(2) a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly, per a random selection process that at least greater than one-half of the U.N. General Assembly's total membership constituency has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to substitute serve temporarily in the (voting-abstention-required) decision as a Security Council temporary member, that per

cumulative service substitution in the decision for no more than one of all nations so required to abstain from voting in the decision, is able to exercise the (afore-specified) required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full Security Council optional and voluntary voting right -- including its optional and voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the (voting-abstention-required) decision that the (afore-specified mandatorily) vote-abstaining Security Council member (mandatorily of this Article) was required to abstain from voting in; and

(b) if in any decision vote, at least three of the Security Council permanent members, each that may be a Security Council member that, in consequence of this Article, must serve as a temporary Security Council member substitute for a permanent Security Council member, each vote against the decision, the decision then is vetoed conclusively of the three votes, and the decision is not passed of the decision vote.

(c) Every U.N. Security Council member optionally and voluntarily-exercised vote abstention in a decision, must be counted as both one-half vote for and one-half vote against passage of the decision.”

(3) If due to this Article's paragraph (2) Security Council member substitution requirement, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members – including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in

the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”

A United Nations contact email page has been available at:
<https://www.un.org/en/contact-us-0>.

The "United States Mission to the United Nations" "Contact Us" page, has been available at: <https://usun.usmission.gov/mission/contact-us/>. Their street address is: United States Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017.

Per the internet, we also may vote comment with the U.S.A. Department of State, of:
<https://register.state.gov/contactus/contactusform> .

Question: On 03/15/2025 I asked Copilot AI (Artificial Intelligence) “Will Copilot analyze and assay the U.N. Charter amendment proposals that are quoted after the first colon within this sentence, so as to identify and then report to me, every -- if any -- ambiguity, paradox, legal language deficiency, punctuation error, and syntax error that is present in those proposals' statement language construction and subject message intent content, where those proposals completely herewith are quoted so:

[Amendment proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Functions And Powers Article 10:](#)

“Article 10 - 1. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 10 – 2. If upon receiving from a UN General Assembly International Security quorum, -- that of the UN General Assembly's simple majority, is ratified completely as being currently adequately valid to recognize for all of the UN, any nation's international security status, -- the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the General Assembly finds to an extent of 44% or greater affirmatively, in the General Assembly's finding decision vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that respectively currently the nation of the quorum's security description, is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of aggression, the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until the UN General Assembly, from greater than 56% of its vote, that both is subsequent to its previously herewith described vote findings pertaining to the security status description of the nation, and that is respectively under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, votingly finds affirmatively that the nation isn't a party so.”, or

[Amendment proposal 2 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Functions And Powers Article 10:](#)

“Article 10 - 1. The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may

make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 10 – 2. If upon receiving from a UN General Assembly International Security quorum, that of the UN General Assembly's simple majority, is ratified completely as being currently specifically valid to recognize for all of the UN, any nation's international security status, the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the General Assembly finds to an extent of 44% or greater affirmatively, in the General Assembly's finding decision vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that respectively currently the nation of the quorum's security description is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of aggression, the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until the UN General Assembly, from greater than 56% of its subsequent vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, finds affirmatively that the nation isn't a party so.”, or

[Amendment proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Voting Article 18:](#)

“Article 18 - 4. Per this exception to subArticle 18 – 2, if upon receiving from a UN General Assembly International Security quorum, -- that of the UN General Assembly's simple majority is ratified completely as being currently specifically valid to recognize for all of the UN, any nation's international security status,-- the quorum's current security status description of a nation, the UN General Assembly votes 44% or greater affirmatively, in the General Assembly's vote decision under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, that currently respectively the nation of the quorum's security description is of other than U.N. deployment, a party to a dispute, and/or a party to a threat to the peace, and/or a party to a breach of the peace, and/or a party to an act of aggression; the UN shall respect the nation of the quorum's security description as being a party so, until the UN General Assembly, from greater than 56% of its subsequent vote under this Charter 's Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII, finds

affirmatively that the nation isn't a party so.”?”

CoPilot AI 03/15/2025 Answer: “The provided amendment proposals contain complex legal language, which can sometimes obscure meaning or introduce ambiguities. Here's an analysis of each proposal, identifying potential issues such as ambiguities, paradoxes, language deficiencies, punctuation errors, and syntax errors.

Amendment Proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Functions And Powers Article 10

1. Ambiguities:

- The phrase "ratified completely as being currently adequately valid" is unclear. The terms "completely," "adequately," and "valid" could have overlapping meanings, leading to redundancy and confusion.
- The use of "currently" multiple times creates uncertainty about the specific time frame being referred to.
- The reference to "respect the nation of the quorum's security description" is vague. Does "respect" imply compliance, acknowledgment, or something else?

2. Paradoxes:

- It appears paradoxical to have a finding "to an extent of 44% or greater affirmatively" influence decisions about a nation's security status. This percentage may not align with typical decision-making thresholds in international law, potentially contradicting principles of majority rule.

3. Legal Language Deficiencies:

- The repetition of certain phrases, such as "Chapter VI, and/or paragraph 3 of Article 52, and/or Chapter VII," makes the text unnecessarily cumbersome.
- Phrases like "is of other than U.N. deployment" are not standard legal terminology, making their intent ambiguous.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Errors:

- The sentence structure is overly convoluted, with excessive use of commas

and dashes, leading to difficulty in comprehension.

- The phrase "that both is subsequent to its previously herewith described vote findings" is awkwardly constructed and overly formal.

Amendment Proposal 2 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Functions And Powers Article 10

1. Ambiguities:

- Similar to Proposal 1, the phrase "ratified completely as being currently specifically valid" suffers from redundant and unclear language.
- "Specifically valid to recognize for all of the UN" is ambiguous—what does "specifically valid" mean, and how is "recognition" being defined?

2. Paradoxes:

- The use of "44% or greater" as a threshold remains potentially contradictory to the General Assembly's typical voting procedures, creating a paradox in decision-making.

3. Legal Language Deficiencies:

- The repetitive and overly complex references to articles and chapters of the Charter make the text unwieldy for legal interpretation.
- Lack of clarity about how findings are operationalized after the decision-making process.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Errors:

- Excessive use of commas and dashes fragments the flow of the text.
- The phrase "finds affirmatively that the nation isn't a party so" is awkwardly constructed and could be rephrased for clarity.

Amendment Proposal 1 for Chapter IV: The General Assembly . . . Voting Article 18

1. Ambiguities:

- The phrase "ratified completely as being currently specifically valid" is vague and redundant.
- "Currently respectively the nation of the quorum's security description is of other than U.N. deployment" is not clear in its intent or meaning.

2. Paradoxes:

- The reliance on a 44% affirmative vote threshold, followed by a greater than 56% threshold, creates a potential paradox in the decision-making hierarchy.

3. Legal Language Deficiencies:

- Similar to the other proposals, the repetition of certain phrases and references makes the text unnecessarily complicated.
- The proposal lacks a clear explanation of what happens procedurally between the two voting thresholds.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Errors:

- Overuse of commas, dashes, and long-winded clauses makes the text difficult to read.
- The phrase "until the UN General Assembly, from greater than 56% of its subsequent vote" is confusingly constructed and could benefit from simplification.

General Observations

- The amendment proposals would benefit significantly from concise and clear drafting. Simplifying the language, reducing redundancy, and using consistent legal terminology could enhance their effectiveness and comprehensibility.
- Including precise definitions of key terms (e.g., "respect," "quorum," "currently valid") and clearly outlining procedural steps would resolve many ambiguities.

Do you want me to help rephrase or simplify these proposals? I'd be glad to assist!"

(Petitioner's Comment: Since I doubt that Copilot AI can greatly improve and maintain the comprehensive specification and intent of the aforesubmitted to AI, Chapter IV (Article 10) 1, 2, and 1 (Article 18-4) proposals, I declined to request that AI try so. Of this and other Copilot AI reviews of my amendment proposals for the U.N. Charter, Copilot AI appears to aspire for conciseness, simplicity, and possibly brevity that may not be available without a supplemental glossary of terms specifically created for the U.N. Charter.)

Question: On 04/21/2025 I asked Copilot AI (Artificial Intelligence) "Will Copilot analyze and assay the" (a version previous of the 04/29/2025 amendment

proposals version) ”U.N. Charter amendment proposals that are quoted after the first colon within this sentence, so as to identify and then report to me, every -- if any -- ambiguity, paradox, legal language deficiency, punctuation error, and syntax error that is present in those proposals' statement language construction and subject message intent content, where those proposals completely herewith are quoted so:

[Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . .](#)
[Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(1) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Security Council, provided that each **United Nations (U.N.)** Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision specifically pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision specifically pertains to, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for both each voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation so, and each voting-abstention-required Security Council decision so, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the voting-abstention-required decision, in place of and for only one of however many voting-abstention-required Security Council member nations then are required to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation's full voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the Security Council member nation's voluntary voting abstention right – only for voting in the decision that the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(2) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members – including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of the remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough

Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”, or

[Amendment Proposal 1-1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(1) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including all – if any -- concurring votes that in the decision are cast of the permanent members that do not abstain from then voting; provided that each U.N. Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision specifically pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision specifically pertains to, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the (abstention-required) decision in place of and for only one of however many (required to abstain from voting) Security Council member nations then are required to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's full voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(2) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in

the decision, plus -- per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision -- each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision."

CoPilot AI 04/21/2025 Answer:

Analyzing and assessing such detailed amendment proposals involves identifying potential ambiguities, paradoxes, deficiencies in legal language, punctuation, and syntax. I'll break this process into key observations for clarity.

Observations on Amendment Proposal 1

1. Ambiguity:

- Phrases like "non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace" could be interpreted differently depending on jurisdiction or circumstances, leading to inconsistent applications.

(Petitioner's Comment: Copilot here is without the definition determination context of the phrase "party to a dispute" that I establish with my amendment proposals for U.N. Charter Chapter IV Articles 10 and 18.)

- The "random selection process" for temporary Security Council members is vaguely described, leaving uncertainty about how disputes over "minimum majority" agreements are resolved.

(Petitioner's Comment: The phrase "random selection process" is adequately specified to allow the U.N. flexibility in choosing its procedures.)

2. **Paradox:**

- The provision that allows temporary members to exercise full voting rights yet limits these rights to a single decision vote creates tension between the principle of equality and practicality.

(Petitioner's Comment: Here the "provision" noted of AI is in consequence of (1) abstention-required members being parties to a dispute (and/or etc. of the amendment proposal) that the decision pertains to, 2) the proposed temporary members being drawn from the same U.N. General Assembly, that the ten 2-year U.N. Security Council members of the 15 members U.N. Security Council membership are drawn from, 3) the proposed temporary members necessarily -- for U.N. Security Council membership decision discussion and voting, full and complete historic responsibility -- being full U.N. Security Council membership able U.N. Security Council members, only while those temporary members are substitute voters on the decision, that a permanent or non-permanent U.N. Security Council member must -- as a non-U.N.-deployed party to a dispute (etc.) -- abstain from voting on.)

- The inclusion of non-Security Council members as decision-makers in what is inherently a Security Council responsibility might dilute the Council's purpose.

(Petitioner's Comment: A reference to the highly unlikely "sequential fallback" scenario of the proposal's subArticle (3)(2), per which the Security Council's authority remains vested in the Security Council's exclusive membership, unless ultimately the U.N. lacks Security Council member nations in the Security Council, and so votes on the Security Council decision of only both all

of whatever U.N. Security Council members, if any, are then present, plus all other then present U.N. General Assembly nation membership. With the U.N. being composed of a large number of nations, like the U.N. in year 2025 is composed of 192 nations, the proposal's subArticles (3)(2) will probably never be implemented, as temporary Security Council members will likely always be adequately available per subArticle (3)(1).)

3. Legal Language Deficiency:

- The proposal relies heavily on parenthetical clarifications and nested clauses, reducing readability and potentially increasing misinterpretation.
- Repetition in terms like "voting-abstention-required" adds unnecessary complexity.

(Petitioner's Comment: The text of the amendment proposals is meant to mostly be recurrently completely descriptive of the subjects and the actions of the proposals. A real problem with specifying the proposals, is not having simple single word descriptive names for some of the circumstances of the proposals.

Although the proposals may be composed of abbreviated and/or condensed terms, so as to provide both brevity, and wording length-dependent continuity of expression for the proposals in the U.N. Charter; timely full exclusive accomplishment of the intent of the amendments, should not be allowed to be impaired in consequence of reducing the wording of the amendments.

Like elsewhere in literature, repeated use of the same phrases can avoid ambiguity, though be boring and/or stultifying of interest development; and synonymous phrasings may provide flexibility and optimize interest for a literary subject; however to avoid ambiguity, legal specifications often require avoiding generalization that may occur of using some similar phrasings for the legal specifications.)

4. Punctuation and Syntax Issues:

- Overuse of em dashes and parentheticals (e.g., “– for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, –”)

interrupts the flow of sentences.

- Long, multi-layered sentences could benefit from being split into simpler structures for greater clarity.

(Petitioner's Comment: "Long, multi-layered sentences" are used to avoid repeating long names and long descriptive phrasings.)

Observations on Amendment Proposal 1-1

1. Ambiguity:

- Similar to Proposal 1, terms like "random selection process" and "non-U.N.-deployed party" remain open to varied interpretations.
- The criteria for "minimum quantity" in voting members aren't fully defined.

(Petitioner's Comment: The phrase "random selection process" is adequately specified to allow the U.N. flexibility in choosing its procedures.

The criteria for "minimum quantity" in voting members are defined of Article 23 as “The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations.”, and Article 27 as “a vote of nine members” to make a decision; thus per the amendment proposal -- and here let us emphasize the alteration aspect of "amendment" -- a U.N. council of 9 members may commence a vote and "make a decision", if those 9 members all vote affirmatively on and for the decision.)

2. Paradox:

- The sequential fallback mechanisms (e.g., involving all U.N. members) could lead to scenarios where the decision-making body becomes too large and unwieldy, conflicting with the efficiency expected of the Security Council.

(Petitioner's Comment: Timely U.N. Security Council resolution towards international disputes is very important, and for each decision to be voted on of the U.N. Security Council, once the U.N.'s qualified voting membership is established per U.N. Charter procedure for voting on the decision, the U.N. may then electronically rapidly inform and poll the qualified voting membership for

a vote on the decision (matter).)

3. Legal Language Deficiency:

- Substitutions in terminology (e.g., "abstention-required" to "required to abstain") attempt simplification but do not resolve underlying clarity issues.

(Petitioner's Comment: In modern parlance, the term "decision" appears to often have similar -- though different -- common tense use as does the terms "vote" and "election"; so sometimes I found that for precision, conciseness, and clarity, referring to the term "decision" with phrasings such as "an election decision", "the decision vote", and "vote on the decision matter" seemed practical for avoiding lack of understanding.)

- The repeated use of similar phrases (e.g., "only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain...") adds redundancy.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Issues:

- Parentheses and em dashes are overused, leading to convoluted sentence structures.

(Petitioner's Comment: For reference, here I quote from Punctuate It Right!, © 1993 by H. Shaw: "A dash is the only standard mark of punctuation not represented on the usual typewriter or computer keyboard. In typing, the dash is made by two hyphens (–); in handwriting, it is shown by a line about as long as two hyphens. In printing, the mark is referred to as an *em dash*. Actually, printers use three dashes: an *en dash* (which in typing and handwriting is represented by a mark the length of a hyphen), the *em dash* (two hyphens), and the *2-em* (or sometimes longer) dash. The double dash, or long dash, is rarely needed in writing. The em dash (–) is what we usually have in mind when we talk about dashes in writing." Here is a hyphen (-) and a two hyphen em dash (–) from my computer keyboard software.)

- The conditional chains (e.g., "if...then...or if...then") make parsing the intent difficult.

Suggestions for Refinement

- **Simplify Language:** Replace convoluted phrases and nested clauses with straightforward and precise wording.

- **Define Terms Clearly:** Provide explicit definitions for terms like "random selection process," "minimum quantity," and "non-U.N.-deployed party."
- **Improve Sentence Structure:** Break long sentences into shorter ones, using clear connectors to improve readability.
- **Streamline Mechanisms:** Reassess the decision-making fallback processes to ensure efficiency while maintaining fairness.

([Petitioner's Comment](#): AI here employs some well-known general writing guidelines as relevant stock rhetoric for writing improvement. I estimate that AI likely didn't coherently reference the amendment proposals with the current U.N. Charter, for Charter composition development increase.)

Would you like me to expand on any specific part or propose alternative language for these amendments?

Question: On [04/21/2025](#) I asked Copilot AI (Artificial Intelligence) “Will Copilot AI analyze and assay the” (a version previous of the [04/29/2025 amendment proposals version](#)) ”U.N. Charter amendment proposals that are quoted after the first colon within this sentence, so as to identify and then report to me, every -- if any -- ambiguity, paradox, legal language deficiency, punctuation error, spelling error, and syntax error that is present in those proposals' statement language construction and subject message intent content, where those proposals completely herewith are quoted so:

[Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression Article 51:](#)

“(1) Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under

the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(2) When any member of the Chapter V Article 23 United Nations Security Council members, is – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, each U.N. Security Council member that is a party so, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that specifically pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and each so abstention-required decision, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to temporarily substitute serve in the abstention-required decision in place of and for only the Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to

exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full voluntary Security Council voting right -- including the member's voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of the remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision."

“(2) Each member of the Chapter V Article 23 United Nations Security Council members, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that specifically pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council voting-abstention decision so required, and each Security Council member nation that in the decision is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then is not a Security Council member, and both

(a) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to the same Chapter VI dispute, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression that the (aforespecified mandatorily) vote-abstaining member is an other than U.N.-deployed party to, and

(b) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict that, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that the U.N. Security Council (aforespecified) voting abstention-required decision specifically pertains to;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly, per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to substitute serve temporarily in the (voting-abstention-required) decision as a Security Council temporary member, that per cumulative service substitution in the decision for no more than one of all nations so required to abstain from voting in the decision, is able to exercise the (aforespecified) required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full Security Council voluntary voting right -- including its voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the (voting-abstention-required) decision that the

(aforespecified mandatorily) vote-abstaining Security Council member (mandatorily of this Article) was required to abstain from voting in; and

(c) if in any decision vote, at least three of the Security Council permanent members, each that may be a Security Council member that, in consequence of this Article, must serve as a temporary Security Council member substitute for a permanent Security Council member, each vote against the decision, the decision then is vetoed conclusively of the three votes, and the decision is not passed of the decision vote.

(3) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all, if any, Security Council members – including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus -- per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision -- each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that **may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”**

[CoPilot AI 04/21/2025 Answer:](#)

Analyzing these amendment proposals involves identifying ambiguities, paradoxes, language deficiencies, and errors. Below are my observations:

Observations on Amendment Proposal 1

1. Ambiguities:

- Terms like "non-U.N.-deployed party" and "materially physically violent civil trespass conflict" are not clearly defined and could lead to interpretation issues.
- The "random selection process" lacks detail regarding its implementation, such as specific procedures to ensure fairness and transparency.

2. Paradoxes:

- The proposal requires non-Security Council members to act as temporary Security Council members, potentially contradicting the purpose of the Security Council as a specialized decision-making body.

3. Legal Language Deficiencies:

- Excessive use of parentheticals, such as “– for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, –,” interrupts sentence flow and reduces clarity.
- The use of repetitive phrases like “voting-abstention-required” complicates understanding without adding value.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Errors:

- Overuse of em dashes and parentheticals leads to convoluted sentences.
- Sentences are excessively long, with overly complex structures that hinder readability.

5. Spelling Errors:

- None detected in this proposal.

Observations on Alternative Amendment Proposal 2

1. Ambiguities:

- Terms like “physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy” are vague and open to multiple interpretations.
- The criteria for determining "minimum majority" and "minimum quantity" are insufficiently elaborated.

2. Paradoxes:

- The introduction of temporary members with veto rights contradicts the traditional roles and privileges of permanent Security Council members, which might lead to disputes over legitimacy.

3. Legal Language Deficiencies:

- The use of terms like “(aforespecified mandatorily)” and nested clauses reduces accessibility for readers and practitioners.
- Repetitive wording (e.g., “voting-abstention-required decision”) makes the proposal unnecessarily verbose.

4. Punctuation and Syntax Errors:

- Similar to Proposal 1, the overuse of parentheticals and em dashes disrupts the logical flow of the text.
- Conditional constructs like "if...then...or if..." are cumbersome and confusing.

5. Spelling Errors:

- None detected in this proposal.

Suggestions for Refinement

1. Clarify Ambiguous Terms:

- Provide precise definitions for terms like “non-U.N.-deployed party” and “minimum majority.”

2. Simplify Language:

- Replace convoluted phrases with concise, clear wording to enhance readability and precision.

3. **Reassess Fallback Mechanisms:**

- Streamline the substitution process to avoid introducing inefficiencies or undermining the Security Council's structure.

4. **Structure Sentences for Clarity:**

- Break long sentences into shorter, logically connected ones for better comprehension.

5. **Eliminate Redundancies:**

- Avoid repetitive phrases and redundant clauses that add unnecessary complexity.

Would you like me to assist with rephrasing parts of these proposals or providing alternative wording for clarity and precision?

Question: On [04/15/2025](#) I asked Copilot AI (Artificial Intelligence) “**Will Copilot analyze and assay the U.N. Charter amendment proposals that are quoted after the first colon within this sentence, so as to identify and then report to me, every -- if any -- ambiguity, paradox, legal language deficiency, punctuation error, and syntax error that is present in those proposals' statement language construction and subject message intent content, where those proposals completely herewith are quoted so:**

[Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(1) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Security Council, provided that each **United Nations** (U.N.) Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision pertains to, must -- to remain in compliance

with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for both each voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation so, and each voting-abstention-required Security Council decision so, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy, that pertains to the Security Council voting-abstention-required decision;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the voting-abstention-required decision, in place of and for only one of however many voting-abstention-required Security Council member nations then are required to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation's full voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the Security Council member nation's voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the voting-abstention-required Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(2) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members --

that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of the remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”, or

[Amendment Proposal 1-1 for U.N. Charter Chapter V: The Security Council . . . Voting Article 27:](#)

“(3)(1) Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including all – if any -- concurring votes that in the decision are cast of the permanent members that do not abstain from then voting; provided that each U.N. Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- in any decision under Chapter VI, and/or under paragraph 3 of Article 52, is of other than U.N. deployment a party to a dispute that the decision pertains to, or in any decision under Chapter VII, is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a threat to the peace, and/or to a breach of the peace, and/or to an act of aggression that the decision pertains to, must -- to remain in

compliance with this Charter -- abstain from voting in the decision; and for each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that pertains to the Security Council (abstention-required) decision;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, and to temporarily substitute serve in the (abstention-required) decision in place of and for only one of however many (required to abstain from voting) Security Council member nations then are required to abstain from voting in the decision, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's full voluntary Security Council member nation voting right -- including the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation's voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3)(2) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members --

that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus -- per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision -- each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that **may**, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, **vote** in the decision; **or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision;** or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must -- to remain in compliance with this Charter -- either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”

[CoPilot AI 04/15/2025 Answer:](#)

Analyzing these lengthy amendment proposals is quite intricate, as they involve complex legal language and numerous conditions. However, I'll do my best to identify ambiguities, paradoxes, and language or structural deficiencies. Let's begin by highlighting key points about each proposal:

Amendment Proposal 1

1. Ambiguity:

- The phrase "provided that each United Nations (U.N.) Security Council member nation, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force," is convoluted and unclear in intent. The "for example" clause disrupts comprehension.

- The criteria for "voting-abstention-required" members are highly intricate, relying on many conditional phrases (e.g., "non-U.N.-deployed party") that could lead to interpretation disagreements.
- The random selection process by the General Assembly lacks defined parameters. What happens if a majority cannot agree on the randomization method?

2. **Paradox:**

- The replacement mechanism allows temporary members to vote in place of abstention-required members, effectively granting non-Security Council members voting power in highly sensitive decisions. This could undermine the exclusivity of the Security Council's authority.
- The stipulation to replace abstention-required members seems at odds with ensuring impartiality, as temporary members might not fully understand the context of the dispute.

3. **Deficiencies:**

- Excessive use of long-winded, multi-conditional sentences impairs readability and increases the risk of misinterpretation.
- Lack of punctuation consistency (e.g., overuse of dashes and parentheses) complicates the proposal.
- Redundancy in clauses, particularly in listing conditions (a, b, c), could be streamlined for clarity.

4. **Syntax Errors:**

- Repetition of phrases like "to remain in compliance with this Charter" creates redundancy.

Amendment Proposal 1-1

1. **Ambiguity:**

- The phrase "including all – if any -- concurring votes that in the decision are cast of the permanent members that do not abstain from

then voting" is overly complex and could be simplified for clarity.

- As with Proposal 1, the replacement process for abstention-required members lacks sufficient detail.

2. **Paradox:**

- Similar to Proposal 1, empowering randomly selected non-members to vote in critical decisions introduces potential biases and undermines Security Council's original structure.
- The escalation mechanism for selecting additional members raises concerns about decision legitimacy if the voting body becomes a mixed assembly of permanent, temporary, and random members.

3. **Deficiencies:**

- Over-reliance on conditional clauses (e.g., "if then possible, or if then not possible") results in convoluted sentence structures.
- Lack of clarity in the escalation mechanism, particularly how ties or unanimous abstentions are resolved.

4. **Syntax Errors:**

- Spelling errors such as "decison" (instead of "decision") occur multiple times. (Petitioner's Comment: I have subsequently corrected the "decison" --> "decision" spelling errors.)
- Redundant qualifiers like "if any" disrupt the flow and could be omitted without losing meaning.

General Observations

Both proposals attempt to address the issue of voting abstentions in sensitive decisions but at the cost of significant complexity. The numerous conditions and replacement mechanisms create legal ambiguities and practical enforcement challenges. Simplifying the language, defining processes more clearly, and addressing potential paradoxes would strengthen these proposals.

Would you like me to focus on refining one of these proposals or delve deeper into specific aspects?

(Petitioner's Comment: AI's Amendment Proposal 1 Paradox comment that . . . “allows temporary members to vote in place of abstention-required members, effectively granting non-Security Council members voting power “ . . . “ could undermine the exclusivity of the Security Council's authority.” fails to recognize: 1) abstention-required members are parties to a dispute (and/or etc. of the amendment proposal) that the decision pertains to, 2) the proposed temporary members are drawn from the same U.N. General Assembly, that the ten 2-year U.N. Security Council members of the 15 members U.N. Security Council membership are drawn from, 3) the proposed temporary members are full U.N. Security Council membership able members of the U.N. Security Council, while those temporary members are members of the U.N. Security Council, 4) the Security Council's authority remains vested in the Security Council's exclusive membership, unless ultimately the U.N. lacks Security Council member nations in the Security Council, and so votes on the Security Council decision of only both all of whatever U.N. Security Council members, if any, are then present, plus all other then present U.N. General Assembly nation membership.

I declined to request AI to “focus on refining one of these proposals or delve deeper into specific aspects”, because AI doesn't realize that the purpose of the amendments is to provide the most impartial Security Council voting on dispute decisions, without failing to ultimately resolve the decisions of a U.N. decision vote, be that vote a greatest majority, or a tie, or an absolute and total vote abstention that functions as a tie, per that abstention yielding no passage or failure of the decision matter*, though sometimes -- depending for example on the relevance of the decision matter -- yielding a possible reintroduction of the vote on the decision matter.) *["Article 27- 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural **matters** . . . , Article 27- 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other **matters**” (*Italics and underlining mine*)]

Question: On 04/15/2025 I asked Copilot AI (Artificial Intelligence) “Will Copilot AI analyze and assay the U.N. Charter amendment proposals that are quoted after the first colon within this sentence, so as to identify and then report to me, every -- if any

-- ambiguity, paradox, legal language deficiency, punctuation error, spelling error, and syntax error that is present in those proposals' statement language construction and subject message intent content, where those proposals completely herewith are quoted so:

[Amendment Proposal 1 for U.N. Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression Article 51:](#)

“(1) Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

(2) When any member of the fifteen United Nations Security Council members, is – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, each U.N. Security Council member that is a party so, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and each so abstention-required decision, a U.N. member nation that then

(a) is not a Security Council member, and

(b) is not a party of other than U.N. deployment, to the same Chapter VI, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression, that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member

nation must, as a non-U.N.-deployed party of, abstain from voting in a decision on, and

(c) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media production trespass controversy that pertains to the Security Council abstention-required decision;

to temporarily substitute serve in the abstention-required decision in place of and for only the Security Council member nation that is so required to abstain from voting, and to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to temporarily serve in the Security Council as a Security Council temporary member, that then is able to exercise the required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full voluntary Security Council voting right -- including the member's voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the decision that the required to abstain from voting Security Council member nation mandatorily was required to abstain from voting in.

(3) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Security Council members-only Ch. V Article 23 decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all Security Council members -- including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus, per random draw from all -- if any -- of the remaining Security Council members that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision, each of only enough of the remaining Security Council members, to if then possible, provide the Security Council with the rest of the members that may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, vote in the decision; or if that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally -- per random draw from all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then aren't selected to vote in the decision -- each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and

together with all of any U.N. members that then are qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 23, or that then being impossible of Security Council numerical constituency, per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, each U.N. member -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, so as to provide the decision of a U.N. vote, whereof the greatest majority vote, or a tie of opposite votes, or a unanimous abstention of all of the voters of the vote's total results, must prevail to resolve the decision, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”

Alternative Amendment Proposal 2 for U.N. Chapter VII, Article 51:

“(2) Each member of the fifteen United Nations Security Council members, that – for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force, -- is a non-U.N.-deployed party to a Chapter VI dispute, and/or to a paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or to a Chapter VII threat to the peace, breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression, that the U.N. Security Council is voting on in a decision, must to remain in compliance with this Charter, abstain from voting in each U.N. Security Council decision that pertains to the dispute, and/or threat to the peace, and/or breach of the peace, and/or act of aggression that the member is so a party to; and for both each Security Council voting-abstention decision so required, and each Security Council member nation that in the decision is so required to abstain from voting, a U.N. member nation that then is not a Security Council member, and both

(a) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to the same Chapter VI dispute, and/or same paragraph 3 of Article 52 dispute, and/or same Chapter VII threat, peace breach, and/or aggression that the (aforespecified mandatorily) vote-abstaining member is an other than U.N.-deployed party to, and

(b) is not a non-U.N.-deployed party to any materially physically violent civil trespass conflict, and/or physically obstructive material, energy, and/or social media

production trespass controversy, that pertains to the Security Council (aforespecified) voting abstention-required decision;

to remain in compliance with this Charter, must of the U.N. General Assembly, per a random selection process that the U.N. General Assembly of its minimum majority has agreed to then use, be randomly selected to substitute serve temporarily in the (voting-abstention-required) decision as a Security Council temporary member, that per cumulative service substitution in the decision for no more than one of all nations so required to abstain from voting in the decision, is able to exercise the (aforespecified) required to abstain from voting Security Council member's full Security Council voluntary voting right -- including its voluntary voting abstention right -- only for voting in the (voting-abstention-required) decision that the (aforespecified mandatorily) vote-abstaining Security Council member (mandatorily of this Article) was required to abstain from voting in; and

(c) if in any decision vote, at least three of the Security Council permanent members, each that may be a Security Council member that, in consequence of this Article, must serve as a temporary Security Council member substitute for a permanent Security Council member, each vote against the decision, the decision then is vetoed conclusively of the three votes, and the decision is not passed of the decision vote.

(3) If due to the Security Council member substitution requirement of this Article, enough United Nations member nations to comprise and vote in a Ch. V Article 23 Security Council members-only decision vote, can't be selected for a decision, each of all Security Council members – including all Security Council temporary members -- that then are qualified and selected to vote in the decision, plus -- per random draw from all of the remaining Security Council members, if any, that then were required per this Article to abstain from voting in the decision -- each of only enough of those remaining Security Council members, to provide the Security Council with the rest of -- if then possible, or if then not possible, at least the minimum quantity of -- the members that **may, per Ch. V Article 23 and Article 27 of this charter, **vote** in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, then additionally to that draw's results, per random draw from**

all of the remaining U.N. members, if any, that then haven't been selected to participate in the decision vote, each of only enough of the remaining U.N. members, to in addition to and together with all of the U.N. members, if any, that then have been qualified and selected of this Article to vote in the decision, vote decisively per Ch. V Article 27 of this charter in the decision; or if then that draw is yet insufficient to provide enough Security Council members so to vote, all U.N. members -- if any -- that the U.N. then is comprised of, must either vote or abstain from voting in the decision.”

[CoPilot AI 04/15/2025 Answer:](#)

These amendment proposals are highly intricate, with numerous conditions and legal language complexities. Here's my analysis highlighting ambiguities, paradoxes, deficiencies, punctuation or syntax issues, and any spelling errors:

Amendment Proposal 1 Analysis

Ambiguities:

1. The term “for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force” lacks clarity and disrupts comprehension.
2. The criteria for "abstention-required" members and the conditions in subsections (a), (b), and (c) are highly complex and could lead to differing interpretations.
3. The random selection process by the U.N. General Assembly isn't defined sufficiently—how is the process implemented if no majority is reached?

Paradoxes:

1. Allowing a randomly selected non-Security Council member to vote in critical decisions dilutes the exclusivity and intended impartiality of the Security Council.
2. While attempting to ensure fairness, the replacement process creates a paradox where temporary members might lack sufficient context for informed decisions.

Deficiencies:

1. Excessive use of nested clauses (e.g., "if then possible, or if then not possible") impairs readability and comprehension.
2. Redundancies, such as repeated references to compliance with the Charter, make the text overly verbose.

Syntax Errors:

1. The spelling error “constuency” (should be "constituency") is present.
([Petitioner's Comment](#): I have subsequently corrected the “constuency” --> "constituency" spelling errors.)
2. Overuse of parentheses and dashes disrupts the readability and flow.

Punctuation Errors:

1. Inconsistent use of dashes, semicolons, and commas—especially in long clauses—creates confusion.

Amendment Proposal 2 Analysis

Ambiguities:

1. The phrase “for example, of physical deployment of its national public security force” remains problematic here as well, due to its vague context.
2. Subsection (c) introduces a new veto mechanism by three permanent members; however, the process for implementing this is left unclear and could conflict with the original veto framework.

Paradoxes:

1. The proposed mechanism of cumulative temporary member substitution risks diminishing the proportional authority of permanent members.
([Petitioner's Comment](#): Permanent members that are non-U.N.-deployed parties to a dispute (and/or etc. of the amendment proposal), are not impartial to the dispute (and/or etc. *ibid.*), and shouldn't vote on the U.N. Security Council decision on the dispute (*ibid.*), unless impartial U.N. member nations aren't available to vote on the decision.)

2. The introduction of a new veto method undermines the Security Council's established voting structure.

(Petitioner's Comment: I do not uphold a current year 2025 interpretation of the U.N. Charter, that endorses that any U.N. Security Council decision must always fail to pass, if any one U.N. Security Council permanent member votes a veto on – i.e. “vetoes” -- the decision. Only in the Ch. VII Alternative Amendment Proposal (2)(b), do I provide that if any three permanent members veto the same decision, the decision then fails to pass.)

Deficiencies:

1. Overly complex sentence structures, particularly those with multiple nested conditions, reduce accessibility and hinder comprehension.
2. The "random selection process" still lacks operational details, raising concerns about its feasibility in real-world scenarios.

Syntax and Spelling Errors:

1. Words like “decision” are repeatedly misspelled as “decison.”
2. The text often uses redundant qualifiers like “if any,” which add little value to the meaning.

Punctuation Errors:

1. Inconsistent usage of punctuation marks, including parentheses and commas, negatively affects readability.

General Observations

Both proposals attempt to resolve voting abstentions for Security Council decisions involving conflicts of interest. However:

- The legal language is unnecessarily convoluted, with an overuse of conditional statements that compromise clarity.
- The replacement mechanisms raise significant issues regarding practicality, impartiality, and potential conflicts with existing Charter principles.

Would you like me to simplify or refine any specific aspect of these proposals for

better clarity and feasibility?